original work published by Van Gorcum (1998) received over two dozen reviews,
including one in this journal (James E. Miller, AUSS 28[1990]:175-177). Among the
most substantial reviews are those by James H. Charlesworth (PJB 12[1991]:107-110);
Baruch Halpern ( H J 3 1[I990]:218-222); James A. Sanders (JAOS 111[I 991]:374-376);
and Carol A. Newsom (JSP 7 [I 990]:122-126; reprinted in JSP 8 [1991]:111-115).
Given the fact that sixteen years transpired before the reprinting, it might have
been useful for the work to have been updated. Certainly, an updated edition would
have been a more fitting tribute in honor of Mulder. Nevertheless, many who did not
buy the book then will welcome this second opportunity to do so.
Oakwood College
Huntsville, Alabama
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Pelikan, Jaroslav. Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2004. xiii + 216 pp. Hardcover, $30.00.
Having formally studied both theology and law, I have been intrigued by the parallels
between the interpretation of the Bible and the U.S. Constitution. Both are relatively old
documents, written by multiple authors, and infused with broad, and at times apparently
conflicting principles; yet both documents are applied to govern specific details of many
modem lives. It seems that our experience in interpreting one could shed light on the
reading of the other, and vice versa.
However, I had come across no attempt to systematically compare the two worlds
of interpretation untilJaroslav Pelikan's recent effort crossed my desk. Pelikan is Sterling
Professor of History Emeritus at Yale University and an authority on Christian creeds
and tradition. He also displays a broad grasp of the history and practice of constitutional
theory and interpretation.
Pelikan's discussion consists of four parts: a comparison of the authoritative role
that Scripture and the Constitution play in their respective communities, a comparison
of interpretive questions raised by the two documents, a review of the role of original
intent in understanding both the literal words and spiritual principles of the documents,
and a review of how doctrinal development occurs in the fields of law and theology.
That the Bible and the Constitution play similarly authoritative roles in their
communities is not a new thought, but Pelikan proposes that the similarities of the
interpretive communities and traditions around each document have been overlooked.
Pelikan identifies four interpretive communities for each document: "we the people,"
academic scholars, professional clergy and lawyers, and the magisterial and ecclesiastical
hierarchy. He admits of the importance of all groups, but he views the fourth group, the
judges and justices of the courts, and the bishops and councils of the churches, as most
authoritative. They can, he asserts, "trump all others" (30). Because of this, he will focus
on the interpretive methods and standards of thls latter group.
This is the first indication that Pelikan will employ a primarily hierarchical view of
biblical interpretive authority, one associated most strongly with the traditional Catholic
position, although shared by other traditions that uphold a strong, central interpretive
authority. By contrast, there is a strong tradition within Protestanism holding that there
is no ultimate earthly interpretive authority for the Bible.
While Protestant churches within this heritage do have doctrinal statements, these
differ from Catholic dogmas in that they do not, or at least are not meant to, have equal
authority with Scripture. Rather, these statements are subject to Scripture and can be
modified and changed in hght of further scriptural insight. Thus many Protestant groups

have no equivalent of an earthly Supreme Court to give the defulitive doctrinal position
on a biblical passage or doctrine.
The focus on a centralized, interpretive hierarchy influences how Pelikan deals with
his second section, that of issues, or cruxes, of interpretation. Both the Bible and the
Constitution contain a m b e t i e s and puzzling statements that require interpretation.
Should you really poke out your eye if you struggle with lust? Can camels really thread
needles, or are all rich people lost? Does "due process of law" mean you get a jury to
contest a speeding ticket? Does freedom of speech protect all lying, cheating, or
obscenities?
These questions raise similar sorts of interpretive issues, such as how literally or
figuratively one should read language. It also requires one to decide how much, if at all,
one should rely on external sources, such as history and other literature, to understand
that language. Also, in both texts, some issues require reference to "contemporary
community standards," rather than absolute values. What is reverent, and even biblically
required, for a church in one place and time--e.g., women wearing hats in church-may
be ostentatious and inappropriate in another. Similarly, differing local mores mean that
what is constitutionally obscene in one community may be acceptable in another.
How should these interpretive questions be handled? And who should handle
them? These two questions are of equal importance. Deciding "who" decides can often
shape and even determine "howyythe deciding is done. And in commenting on the
question of "who" is the final arbiter, Pelikan again shows his hierarchical orientation.
While he recognizes that there is some ambiguity, both in relation to the Bible and the
Constitution, as to who is the final interpretive authority, the ambiguity he allows is a
narrow one. Only a few thinkers on the fringe really dispute the final interpretive
authority of the U.S. Supreme Court as regards the Constitution. The weight of time and
practice have suffocated any meaningful arguments to the contrary.
Pelikan's view of the "arnbguity" of biblical interpretive authorities seems equally
narrow. They are: church councils, the papacy, and the Holy Spirit. But as the Holy Spirit
lacks an earthly corporeal presence, and as church councils are notoriously contlicted on
almost any question of theology, one can sense which entity Pelikan may view as having the
strongest claim to interpretiveauthority. But whether the answer is the church council or
the papacy, the point is that Pelikan places the authority for interpretation at the top of the
church hierarchy, and not as diffusely lying within the body of Christ.
One may disagree with Pelikan's emphasis on church hierarchy. But it must be
admitted that the question he raises is important, and not simple to answer. It is easy for
Protestants to say that God reveals truth to the individualbeliever, studying his or her Bible
under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. But how does that individual truth become part of
the truth of the community of believers? How is group orthodoxy maintained when the
unit of truth is found at the personal level? How does the community not disintegrate into
a disparate collection of subjective and personal truths, with no uniting Truth?
In the final two sections, Pelikan responds to these questions using principles of
doctrinal development set down by the Catholic theologian John Henry Newrnan, and
comparing these with constitutional doctrinal development. He discusses the search for
original intent, using the unwritten traditions of the church to choose the correct biblical
interpretation, much as the Supreme Court appeals to the founding fathers and Federahf
Papers to guide their opinions. He touches on principles of doctrinal continuity and
progression and creedal confession that he believes preserve ultimate truth for the
community of believers, despite the interpretive problems posed by the Bible.
But these answers assume a commitment to a priestly and papal interpretiveauthority

that most of the Protestant world, at least historically, has denied. Is there no possibility of
maintaining a commitment to absolute moral and spiritual truth in the absence of some
worldly spiritual interpretive authority, such as a pope or counul of bishops?
A constitutional analogy, appropriately, comes to the rescue. Pelikan opens his
book with a quote from Edward Hirsch Levi, a legal scholar. Levi wrote that "the
influence of constitution worship . . . gives freedom to a court. It can always abandon
what it has said in order to go back to the written document itself. . . . By permitting an
appeal to the constitution, the lscretion of the court is increased and change made
possible" (iv). In other words, when the court treats the broader language of the
constitution as ultimately authoritative, rather than its own particular opinions, it is freer
to respond to changing circumstances and to explore new dimensions of existing
constitutional principles. It is freer to get it more right in the end than if it was bound
by its earlier mistakes.
Similarly, a denial of earthly spiritual authority does not prevent the careful
collection of doctrinal statements by groups of believers. Nor does it prevent these
believers from forming voluntary associationsin which a respect and adherence to these
statements becomes a requirement for leaders and teachers. But it does, or should,
prevent those statements from taking on an authority equal to the Bible. A denial of any
ultimate earthly spiritual authority is a safeguard against particular human applications
obscuring the divine principles.
The confessional statementsare, or should be, continuously compared to the broader
principles and teachings of Scripture. Time, circumstances, and growing understanding of
the body of believers may reveal that a particular doctrinal statement is inadequate,
incomplete, or even incorrect. Dissenters should not be dismissed out of hand for
disagreeingwith a confessional statement, but their dissent should be compared with the
Bible itself. The true freedom, and the freest way to truth, is to be able to assert the
authority of the Bible as a corrective to what are merely human constructs of truth.
Constitutional scholars are fond of saying the Supreme Court is not final because
it is right, but it is "right" because it is final. But on this side of eternity, there will be no
"final" statement of spiritual truth, outside the Bible. We have no other creed. Thus we
should resist labeling any earthly body as always and ultimately "right" in matters of
doctrine. For all their similarities, the Bible and the Constitution are ultimately different
in this point, which Pelikan fails to acknowledge-one is of earthly origin, and subject
to earthly authority; but the other is of heaven and knows no final authority here below,
other than the Holy Spirit moving on the individual believer's conscience.
NICHOLAS
MILLER
Berrien Springs, Michigan
Resseguie, James L. SpiftualLandrcqbe: Images oftbe Spiritual Life in the Gospel of Luke.
Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2004. 195 pp. Paper, $19.95.
James Resseguie, Professor of New Testament at Winebrenner Theological Seminary in
Ohio, brings together the disciplines of N T exegesis, literary theory, and spiritual formation
to take a fresh look at the Gospel of Luke. The title's description of the book as "images"
is an apt one, for the scope and size of the book dictate that the Lukan passages covered
be treated more as "snapshots" than with any of the elaboration of a feature presentation.
Despite, however, the sometimes-frustrating brevity with which individual passages must
be treated, the approach offers a creative way of seeing that makes available an abundance
of fascinatinginsights. Resseguie organizes the images in his "album" by using the concept
of "1andscapes"-not only physical, but also social and economic. Within each chapter, he

